The death of Sopa Tulku who set himself on fire on 08 January 2012 and the unrest that ensued in Golog (Chin: Goluo) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP) and neighbouring areas of Eastern Tibet is part of a crisis that has been developing there for almost 10 months. Whereas those who had set themselves ablaze before him had been mostly very young and at the bottom of the religious hierarchy, Sopa Tulku was a middle-aged incarnate lama (tulku), whose suicide potentially deeply impacts the lay congregation. His death appears to shift the crisis towards Golog in Qinghai and away from its original epicentre in Ngaba (Chin: Aba) prefecture in Sichuan. It also represents a move from the Gelugpa tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, to which the Dalai Lama belongs, and that was the only lineage affected thus far, to the Nyingmapa school. This has been read as the prelude to a more generalised upheaval reminiscent of spring 2008. However, while the crisis has indeed gained a new dynamic, under closer scrutiny its pattern of diffusion does not appear as chaotic as has been suggested in some quarters. Golog's specific history and sociology have made it a region where religious schools are atypical in the way that they overlap, and bonds between lamas and the local population, mainly nomadic tribes, have a peculiar quality. With that, the new developments confirm observations that the crisis has progressed through a process of emulation and with a strong sense of shared frustration among groups with the same regional and spiritual affiliations, and hence is a logical continuation of the earlier developments in Ngaba. Reports have tended to pay scant attention to Sopa Tulku's personal situation while overemphasising his status as an incarnate lama. Likewise, the extent of the protest might have been overestimated. All in all, if a Tibet-wide expansion of the protest cannot be precluded, this might be less through its own dynamic than through Tibetan exasperation with the Chinese authorities' heavy-handed response. In that regard, the parallels with the crisis of 2008 are conspicuous.

Sopa Tulku

Tulku Sopa originates from Gade (Chin: Gande) in Golog prefecture(1). He was a reincarnated lama and lived mainly at a monastery situated about 10-15km outside Darlag (Chin: Dari) town, Palnyenmori Namgyal Geden Ling(2), also known as Nyenmo Gonpa, or simply Nyengon. It is a Gelugpa monastery, and like most Gelugpa institutions in the region, it has close connections with Kirti monastery. All previous cases of self-burning involved either monks from Kirti, former monks from Kirti or people who had had a history of links with Kirti.

Most of the monasteries in the region have strong links to local tribes or clans, providing them with religious support in return for receiving offerings from these largely nomadic people. Nyengon is linked to the Hongkor, Sangrima, Jianshe and Oser tribes. Traditionally, it has also been linked to the Borfa tribe, but the tribe once had a dispute with the abbot of the monastery over a holy mountain and ill feelings prevailed for a long time and as a consequence the current status of the relationship is unclear.

Streetview of Darlag.

Streetview of Darlag.

Pictures of the Dalai Lama and the Pa...

A peculiarity of Nyengon is that it has a large number of incarnated lamas (tulkus). Current figures are not known, but according to a generally authoritative written source, two decades ago there were 22 out of a total of 154 monks, a proportion that is unusually high. In around 2004, two or three of these younger tulkus went to China where they reportedly engaged many Chinese students and made connections to some potentially significant donors. This was important because Nyengon was said to be in financial difficulties and was surviving mainly on donations from local communities.

The main gathering hall in Nyengon.

For example, a temple hall built in the first half of the 1990s was still without significant statuary nearly a decade later. It is not known whether Sopa Tulku was one of the lamas that went to China. What is known is that Sopa Tulku was running social programmes, including a school and an old people's home, but just how big these projects were has not been confirmed. Local initiatives such as these, which have become rather common in eastern Tibetan regions, are normally sponsored by external donors and not financed from the monasteries' own income. It is also conceivable that the region's population has recently become more prosperous through the booming business with the yartsa gumbo fungus(3). It is also unclear whether Sopa Tulku was simply in charge of these projects or their initiator. In any case, although he was not a major incarnation at Nyengon, the projects appear to have bestowed on him both respect and notoriety in the region.

General view of Gade.

Although he lived at Nyengon, strictly speaking Sopa Tulku's own monastery, Tongkyab, is located in the region of his birth, about 12km south of Gade town. Tongkyab Gontennye Dargye Ling(4), also known as Tongnyer, has been in trouble before. Several of its monks were involved in a conflict between Tibetan and Muslim communities in August 2007. The dispute flared up over the proposed site for a mosque and it led to unrest between Tibetans and Muslims(5). The discipline master (Tib: geko), then reported to be a young man in his late 20s, was apparently sentenced to eight years for allegedly instigating violence and encouraging people to destroy property. The monastery as a whole had to participate in a 're-education campaign' in 2007 and its abbot, who is said to have been over 70 at that time, was forced to resign, reportedly for refusing to sign a denunciation of the Dalai Lama.

Many monasteries in Golog were set up relatively recently, mainly during the 19th century, and long remained semi-formal, reflecting the strong nomadic tradition of the region, and some also have had a shifting orientation in terms of their allegiance to the different schools of Tibetan Buddhism. Nyengon appears to have been set up in 1825 and have followed the non-sectarian Rime movement, but today it is a Gelugpa monastery. Similarly, the founding of Tongkyab dates back to 1832, apparently as a Nyingmapa monastery, but it seems to have been formalised only in 1981 as a mixed Gelugpa-Nyingmapa institution. In the meantime and due to different factors, it has evolved into a Gelugpa monastery. There has hence been some confusion as to which school Sopa Tulku belonged to. There are indications that his lineage originates in the Nyingmapa tradition, but with his home monastery and the monastery where he was based both being Gelugpa, he must be considered as living within the Gelug tradition. Nyengon is in fact Tongkyab's parent monastery, it is closely connected with the Ragya and Chöling monasteries in Golog and is itself an offshoot of a monastery in Serthar that so far can only be identified under its Chinese name of 'Getai-si'. It is here that on 16 January, following Sopa Tulku's funeral, some small initial protests took place. It is also here on 23 January that trouble broke out that led to the death of one Tibetan protester, as was confirmed by the Chinese authorities. Nyengon and its network of monasteries also entertain close relations with Achongya (Achungya), a monastery belonging to the Jonang tradition, and Panchen (Benza) and Penag (Panag) monasteries of the Palyul-Nyingmapa tradition, all of which are in Pema district and experienced levels of unrest in the same week.

Views of Tongkyab monastery.

Views of Tongkyab monastery.

Views of Tongkyab monastery.

Views of Tongkyab monastery.

Sopa Tulku was also personally linked with Khenpo Jigme Phuntsog and some members of his entourage. Jigme Phuntsog, a lama of the Nyingma lineage, but who was noted for his non-sectarian disposition, was the founder of a Buddhist institute at Serthar (Chin: Seda), the Larung Gar Buddhist Academy. This was established in the early 1980s with the support of the late Panchen Lama as a small, independent, ecumenical establishment. By 2001, it had become a major centre of Tibetan Buddhism and attracted followers from all over Tibet, as well as a significant number of Mainland Chinese disciples. This inevitably led to conflict with the authorities. A considerable number of people had to leave the centre(6) and Jigme Phuntsog was taken to Chengdu, officially for medical treatment but he was placed under de facto house arrest. However he was able to force his return to Serthar about a year later where he ultimately died in January 2004. In the meantime, the Serthar institute has grown again to be today the probably biggest centre of Tibetan Buddhism, by far exceeding the largest official monastery, though there are no official figures. It also hosts a very large number of Chinese Buddhists.

How close the relationship between Sopa Tulku and Jigme Phuntsog was, is unclear. But it is known that Jigme Phuntsog supported Sopa Tulku or his monastery financially and that Sopa Tulku remained close to the Serthar institute. Sopa Tulku's death does not seem to have had visible repercussions at the Serthar institute though. In fact, in view of the dramatic events a decade ago, the institute is extremely keen to keep a low profile and, besides, the Serthar institute is not integrated into the local population in the same way that traditional monasteries are.

View of the Serthar Buddhist Institute.

View of the Serthar Buddhist Institute.

View of the Serthar Buddhist Institute.

Little is known about the personality and biography of Sopa Tulku, but it is certain that he went to India at least twice and that he had been under pressure from the authorities for this reason. Although his trips were not illegal, he was repeatedly questioned and had to live under official surveillance. People who knew him believe that he had difficulties coming to terms with this situation. This year he had intended to travel again in order to attend the Kalachkra initiation performed by the Dalai Lama in January 2012. However, he was refused permission to leave the country. Sources from the region testify that his case was not an isolated one as, probably due to the events in and around Kirti in recent times, many other monks, at least from the Gelugpa tradition in the region, were prevented from going to India.

Reporting a swelling protest

The sole known picture of the protest in Draggo.

Many elements and linkages are still unclear and questions have to be raised about the level of the unrest on 23 and 24 January. Western groups publishing news about Tibet spoke about the first incident on 23 January in terms of "thousands" of protesters, leaving "at least" three or six dead, and 30 wounded by gunfire. The Chinese authorities took an obvious glee at denouncing this as hysteria and elaborated various conspiracy theories. The Chinese state-controlled media for their part spoke of "dozens" of participants in the protests, one dead, and four protesters and five policemen wounded. The almost complete lack of images documenting the clashes is also striking, given the profusion of such in almost all previous incidents since 2006. This resulted in the wide use of photographic and video material from the 2008 protest, leading to a great deal of confusion. A single picture came into circulation via the internet on 25 January, copyrighted by the various groups publishing it, about the protests in Draggo (Chin: Luhuo), which did convey an image of a violent clash, if not the impression of mass participation. A very short video of the demonstrations in Serthar on 24 January that was published by the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) on 26 January shows a larger crowd composed mainly of monks, but is too short (8 seconds) to provide many clues about the protest.

A more realistic report was provided by TCHRD in Dharamsala. Accordingly, for Draggo (Chin: Luhuo), one person, Norpa Yonten (aged 49) was indeed shot dead by the security forces and 36 arrested. Their names are given in the following table. Three of them are said to have been seriously injured and there were reports, described as "unconfirmed", of a further possible casualty.

It is still not entirely clear what exactly triggered the protest in Draggo, as a direct link to the preceding events is not obvious. A Tibetan source reported that nomads, appalled by the behaviour of the authorities following the death of Sopa Tulku, would have gathered there. This is unlikely to be correct and perhaps the result of a misunderstanding. There appears to be no reason for the concerned nomads to gather there instead of in their own region. Besides, those arrested do not appear to be nomads. Given Draggo's relative proximity to the events of recent weeks though, it seems reasonable to assume that some regional linkages and circumstances were at work that currently remain unclear.

In Serthar, TCHRD reported that 300 Tibetans participated in the protest. Two were reportedly shot: Dawa Dakpa from Serwa village and another unidentified person from "Hoen-Dza-Wo" village. About 10 Tibetans were seriously injured and some 40 others were arrested.

One further protest was reported in Dzamthang, but very little is know about it at this stage.

2008.2?

There are indications that the mass demonstrations with 'thousands' of participants reported by some Tibet support groups might have been overestimated, perhaps because of expectations or even hopes of a return to the 2008 scenario. However, there is no denying that the current wave of protests has been unprecedented since 2008 and that the unpredictable chain of reaction which led to the general eruption of protests and rioting at that time has similarities with current events.

Back in 2008, a small group of eastern Tibetan monks(7) temporarily residing in Sera took part in what appears to have been an impromptu demonstration in front of Lhasa's central temple that led to a crackdown on Sera, making any further protests there impossible. However, the monks of other religious institutions linked with Sera (mainly from Ramoche Temple in Lhasa) took up the baton, indirectly triggering a Tibetan crowd that was already sensitive following political pressure and economic problems, and eventually leading within a few hours to a Tibet-wide explosion(8).

But there are also differences. First of all, the general atmosphere in all Tibetan regions then had been extremely tense due to the preparation for the Olympics, while today many Tibetans have little appetite for a repetition of the 2008 events, despite all the grievances that they may have with the regime. Additionally, but still closely connected, the protests in Lhasa had no more specific object than a general resentment towards the Chinese authorities. In comparison, the recent self-burnings and ensuing events, though naturally linked to anger at the regime, have a more direct and very localised cause in the state's interference in and inadequate management of religious affairs here, something that Tibetans in general, and in other regions, do not experience to the same intensity. The self-immolation of Sopa Tulku and the ensuing reactions do represent to an extent the widening of the crisis, which was once confined to Gelugpa clerical circles, and has now spread to other religious traditions and the Tibetan public in general. However, it has still evolved along fault lines or in accordance with patterns that are peculiar to the local context and appear logical in the light of local circumstances but do not necessarily have much validity beyond the region.

Last but not least, the intensity of the events of 2008 was largely a result of a miscalculation on the part of the authorities and subsequently a complete lack of preparation to react as they would have wanted. For instance, there were no significant security arrangements in the east of the Tibetan regions where the unrest was the strongest(9). Today in comparison, the network of security apparatus is far denser and contingency plans are in place, as lessons from 2008 have been learned and the self-burnings crisis has unfolded progressively. The Chinese authorities seem wholly aware of the danger of a repetition of 2008's events and probably believe there is an intention to repeat it, a situation they are firmly determined to stop becoming reality, for instance by currently mobilising massive troop reinforcements from the Mainland as has been reported by Chinese bloggers in Sichuan. Still, the endemic strategic inflexibility in the management of Tibetan affairs and the sheer arrogance of an overwhelming and provocative show of force could well end up in a worst case scenario by crossing the narrow threshold that lies between a local issue and a general explosion as in 2008.

As far as China's international image and soft power generally is concerned, the episode, whatever course it will finally take, is already now a disaster. For example, during a debate that was actually focussed on the genocide of Armenians at the hands of the Turkish state in the early 20th century, Jean Francois Humbert, a member of the French Senate, said with reference to Tibet: "There is no point in recognising past genocides if we do not care about the ones in progress".

Notes:
1: Dpal snyan mo ri rnam rgyal dge ldan gling.
2: How much these fit into the Buddhist ethos is highly questionable, but won't be further developed here.
3: See: Yartsa gunbu, Tibet's underground cash cow (www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/98) and "It reaches into every aspect of rural Tibetan life" (www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/127).
4: Stong skyabs dgon bstan gnyis dar rgyas gling.
5: Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported the case (www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet_muslim-20070822.html) albeit with some errors. First-hand observers report there has never been a mosque in Gade, only a construction site. The conflict was more around attempts to build a mosque, rather than a building itself.
6: Chinese followers and nuns were particularly targeted and it was their houses that were destroyed, officially because they had been built without construction permits.
7: Ironically, it appears that members of the group behind that protest hailed from the regions of North Sichuan and South Qinghai now in renewed unrest.
8: For a comprehensive description of the chain of events on 2008, see: The siege of Sera, April 2008 (www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/173), chapter 'Why Sera?'; and Tibet Spring. Looking back on the 2008 protests. (www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/159), chapter 'From sparks to flames'. 

9: See on that: Recording personal experiences. New insights into the Kardze protests of March 2008 (https://www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/144).