The unexpectedly swift rejection on 07 July 2010 of Tibetan environmentalist Karma Samdrup's appeal against his 15-year prison sentence seem to confirm that, personal differences aside, he and his family have fallen victims of a general reconfiguration of the security status quo in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), and in particular a reconsideration of the role of local NGOs. It results from a strain that has been looming since the fur burning events of 2006 and has become a major concern for the authorities following the unrest of 2008. Directly or indirectly linked, it also represents the flipside of a realignment of the law and order apparatus around Padma Choling, the new TAR governor, that could hardly take place without the ascent of Hu Jintao.

Associated Press (AP) reported on 02 August 2010, that Karma Samdrup's appeal against the sentence, passed down to him on 25 June for alleged grave robbing and related crimes, was rejected by the Intermediate Court of Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture in Xinjiang. His lawyer, Pu Zhiqiang, learned about it only on Monday 01 August 2010, i.e. after a delay of more than three weeks. Pu complained that neither the rejection itself, the surprising pace it came at, nor the delay in informing him were justified. AP quoted him as saying, "I don't know why they're in a such a hurry. What are they afraid of? What are they trying to cover up?" Pu had already outlined a string of legal irregularities that have characterised the case.

Hopes of some friends of Karma Samdrup that the higher authorities might intervene and impose some sort of informal face-saving solution did not materialise. There are precedents for sentences being substantially shortened in exchange for waiving an appeal. If such a deal was proposed, Karma Samdrup might in theory have rejected it. However, such considerations remain totally speculative at the present time.

The suppression of the Samdrup family coincides with the ascent of the new governor of the TAR, Padma Choling (aka Baima Chiling, aka Pema Tinley), whose main task is to look after 'social harmony'(1). Padma Choling's personal authority appears to have been strengthened by his energetic handling of the 'floating population' in Lhasa, i.e. of impoverished Tibetan rural migrants who were key players in the violence of 14 March 2008 in the Tibetan capital(2). He was present during many law and order situations following that - for example, after the earthquake in Damshung – and various protests etc. He replaced Qiangba Phuncog in January 2010, two years earlier than expected.

Although Beijing has essentially maintained its strategy of top down, state sponsored, 'leapfrog' development since 2008, there has been a degree of recognition that social issues were partly responsible for the unrest and some measures have been launched to mitigate some of the negative effects of government policies. An accommodating approach was however flanked by more aggressive policing of the Tibetan population(3). In contrast to his more reserved and low key predecessor, Qiangba Puncog, Padma Choling represents both sturdiness and a populist touch, qualities that he has exploited in his dealings with the 'floating population'. He appears therefore to best embody the new approach in managing Tibetans. Padma Choling was also expected to mediate in a bitter conflict between a major mining project and the local population in Chamdo's Markham county in April 2009(4). He was, however, forced to withdraw by the protestors.

Like Karma Samdrup and his family, Padma Choling, and with him most of those in his personal network, hail from Chamdo prefecture(5), where they must at some point have been confronted with the ubiquitous environmental activities of the Samdrup brothers(6).

Concerns about the environment in Tibet, corruption amongst the leadership and the link between both in the early 2000s moved Beijing to tolerate and, at times, even subtly foster 'reasonable' local environmental initiatives as informal instruments with which to provide checks and balances for prefecture and county levels of government. It is this move that has made grassroots Tibetan civil society possible and has allowed it to carefully but vigorously grow in the past decade. These types of movements were championed by Karma Samdrup and his brother Rinchen. Environmental activists and NGOs, or even ad hoc single-issue bodies, could present claims and succeed with some of their demands by insisting that progressive environmental laws be implemented in effect by local authorities. They had to remain clearly 'law abiding' though, however ambiguous the concept is in a context where, ultimately, the Party retains the prerogative to define or redefine rules and interpret them according to its perceived needs. This could still provide a narrow space within which local governments appeared accountable, if not to the people, at least to a set of rules, and the model seemed fairly promising for a while. It allowed, for example, the fur burning events of 2006 to happen without major friction.

The removal of Karma Samdrup and his entourage indicates however that the margin for tolerance was widely wiped out following the events of 2008. Local NGOs in Tibet have had their role in a specific context; but in the post-2008 scenario, that context has been redefined by new priorities. What was up until recently seen as a meaningful step towards better governance in Tibetan regions is now a potential security threat. Under this new perspective, the Chinese authorities do not seem anymore willing to accept networks that escape the total control of the state. Naturally, as in any purge, some other more personal scores are also being settled. But as a whole, the sequence of events over about one year documents a gradual transformation of the security scenario that led to the dramatic rise of Padma Choling and his network and the downfall of Karma Samdrup and his entourage. In August 2009, Karma Samdrup's two brothers were arrested; in January 2010, he was arrested. In the same month, Padma Choling became TAR governor. In March, cousins of Karma Samdrup were arrested. In May, the Chinese mining company who had been forced to withdraw in 2009 returned to Markham, this time with more assertive support from the local authorities.

Moreover, as the accusations against Karma Samdrup's relatives show, activities which had been long tolerated are now interpreted as direct challenges against the established order. The only exception is Karma Samdrup himself, who was not charged with anything of a political nature. This, however, matches a recurring pattern in Tibetan regions, where the leaders of popular movements are made to fall on the basis of non-political and often dubious accusations. These are probably in order to de-politicise the situation and to demonstrate to their followers that the authorities do not need clear evidence to dismiss those that they disapprove of.

A general consternation and unease among members of the civil society which sources inside Tibet currently report show that this strategy of 'killing the chicken to scare the monkey' has been well-understood and the message well taken.

Notes:
1: See: More of the same, www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/154.
2: See: Managing and servicing the floating population a "key issue for security and development in the TAR", www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/130
3: The security situation in Tibetan regions and in particularly in the TAR is generally the object of much fluctuation where waves of harshness are interspersed with more tolerant phases. The current rigidity arose in the wake of the fur burning events of 2006 amongst fears of possible Tibetan restiveness during the Beijing Olympics. In fact, Tibetan exasperation with the ensuing and pervasive law and order pressure appears to have partly triggered the unrest of 2008.
4: See: Mine standoff said to be resolved, www.tibetinfonet.net/content/news/11029.
5: Incidentally, Chamdo region is also the TAR's last remaining bastion of the Shugden cult which is disapproved by the Dalai Lama and in effect promoted by the Chinese authorities (see: Shugden in Kham, www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/145). There might be a link between Karma Samdrup's case and the Shugden issue, as a source reported to TibetInfoNet that the Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture is also the seat of a Shugden group. The information could, however, not be confirmed before time of publication.
6: Note that an involvement of Karma Samdrup or his family or organisation in the specific case of the Markham mine or mining in general is not insinuated here. In fact, Karma Samdup promotes an attitude of positive engagement towards mining, and he is on record as involving himself or his organisations in this sense.