Both the Tibetan refugee community in Nepal and the Chinese authorities are putting considerable efforts into strengthening their respective influence in the Himalayan country, which, after more than a decade of virtual chaos, is currently experiencing an in-depth reconfiguration of political power. The emerging picture is that both parties are applying fundamentally different strategies: while Tibetans are seeking support from recently elected parliamentarians, as well as from civil society, China strives to develop its influence on both Nepal's army and the former guerrilla forces whose party, the CPN (M)(1), has emerged from the elections of 2008 as Nepal's strongest political force. The outcome of these efforts might well define the future of the Tibetan community in Nepal.

Nepal became a multiparty democracy within the framework of a constitutional monarchy following the revolution of 1990. The new, liberal regime allowed for a previously unheard of freedom of press and political organisation. Ethnic minorities, many of which have close cultural links with Tibet, acquired their first historic opportunity to articulate long suppressed demands. However, the second half of the 1990s saw rampant corruption, poverty, a still semi-feudal society in the countryside, and political power struggles that paved the way for an armed insurgency led by the CPN (M). This dogmatic outfit, linked to India's Naxalite movement, claimed ideological affiliation to Mao Zedong's brand of Communism and regarded today's China as 'revisionist'.

The paralysing insurgency led Nepal's last king, Gyanendra, to orchestrate a bloodless coup with the support of the army in February 2005. China, for whom Nepal's 'Maoists' were a considerable embarrassment, openly supported Gyanendra's attempt to re-establish 'stability' on its sensitive Himalayan border and remained Nepal's sole military supplier, following an arms embargo by the US, the EU and India. In return, the king closed down the Office of the Dalai Lama, and the Tibetan Refugees Welfare Office Kathmandu, both of which had been operating quietly for decades, and introduced stricter policies towards Tibetans living in Nepal. The number of complaints by Tibetans arriving in the country, of abuse, theft, beatings and harassment by Nepalese police and armed forces also rose.

Despite China's support, Nepal's army proved incapable of quelling the insurgency. Internationally isolated, and amidst accusations of human rights violations by the army and an ongoing economic crisis, a popular uprising in 2006 forced the king to relinquish power and reinstate parliament. In an arrangement brokered by India and facilitated by the UN, the established political parties and the CPN (M), who saw its 'People's Liberation Army' increasingly losing ground, agreed to a peace process that saw the re-introduction of democracy and the arrival of the CPN (M) into the political mainstream in order for it to participate in fresh elections to a constituent assembly for the drafting of a new constitution.

Beijing's support for the monarchy, which was finally abolished in Spring 2008, was a source of resentment to most political forces in Nepal and consequently yielded Tibetans an unprecedented level of political freedom. Demonstrations and political events, which even before 2005 had largely been restrained, due to the powerful neighbour in the north, were for a while tolerated by the authorities(2). But the new freedom was to be short lived. Considerations of realpolitik and the perceived necessity, with Chinese help, to counterbalance India's overwhelming and often unpopular influence in Nepal, soon translated into new efforts to bring Tibetan political activities on Nepali soil under control. Proposals to officially reopen the Office of the Dalai Lama were soon rejected and public demonstrations were restricted again. Meanwhile, in an attempt to redress the blatant fiasco of its Nepal policy, China sent delegation after delegation to Kathmandu to foster new influence.

Tibetan demonstration in Bauddhanath, Nepal, August 2008.

The events of spring 2008 in Tibet, and the ensuing Tibetan demonstrations in front of the Chinese embassy in Kathmandu on an almost daily basis, marked a new phase in Chinese-Tibetan confrontation in Nepal, albeit one whose long term impact remains to be seen. Sources familiar with Chinese personnel in Kathmandu report that the demonstrations succeeded in creating a siege mentality and a climate of fear within the embassy, but they were also an open source of annoyance among a Nepali population weary of years of political instability, including some who were broadly supportive of the Tibetan cause. In any case, the political establishment showed itself deeply unsettled by the demonstrations and Western criticism of the rough handling of Tibetan demonstrators. The continuation of demonstrations after the Beijing Olympics in August finally made Nepal's Home Minister, Bam Dev Gautam, ran out of patience and he announced his intention to review the status of all Tibetans living in Nepal and expel all those without valid documentation. The minister later clarified that Tibetans without status would be handed over to the UNHCR with the understanding that they would be deported to India and not to China. Considering that roughly half of Nepal's Tibetan population(3) is estimated to reside there with uncertain status, the proposed measure generated considerable anxiety and curtailed the embassy demonstrations.

The elections to the Constituent Assembly held in April 2008 made clear the Nepali people's dissatisfaction with the established parties. The CPN (M) was able to yield a surprising good result and became with roughly one third of the seats the single largest force in the assembly. In the fertile, lowland Terai region, bordering India, the winner was a new regional party, Madhesi People's Rights Forum (MPRF), who successfully articulated local opposition to the long resented domination of the north and was able to tip the political balance. Together with a third partner, they formed an apparently functional coalition that is now working towards establishing a new and lasting state structure for Nepal. Conscious that they must find channels to influence the new government, both the Tibetan community and the Chinese government have been redoubling their lobbying efforts.

Former Prime MInister of Nepal Koirala on the 65th birthday celebration ...

The Tibetan's currdent strategy acknowledges Nepal's return to a democratic and, in principle, liberal order. Efforts are being made to seek support from NGOs, in particular human rights groups, as well as from international organisations and Western embassies who, in providing crucial aid to Nepal, exert considerable influence. In addition, prominent members of the community are working towards establishing a parliamentary lobby. To this effect, an initial meeting with assembly members was organised in October 2008. It gathered together about 40 members of the Tarai Madhesh Loktantrik Party and the Sadbhawana Party, parties from south Nepal without whose consent no government would likely be able to remain in power. Invitations were also issued to parliamentarians from the CPN (M) who come from ethnic regions where Buddhism predominates. This move reflects the fact that the CPN (M) successfully made ethnic issues, particularly opposition to the domination of high Hindu castes in Nepal's state structure, one of the main focuses of their campaigns. Two CPN (M) parliamentarians accepted the invitation, but were unable to attend the meeting due to other urgent business. The Tibetan community are also to count on long-time supporters among parliamentarians of the remaining parties.

In comparison, China's approach appears more conservative and less confident about the future of democracy in Nepal. Beijing's most recent move was to provide a financial package worth NR100 million (UK£760,000; US$1.26m; EUR€957,000) to the Nepal army. At first glance the Chinese authorities seem to be continuing their policy of supporting the institution that they see as the guarantor of Nepal's stability, but they are also cultivating their former contacts in the army, contacts that might prove useful in the eventuality of a reverse of regime. The army is also one stronghold of Nepal's nationalists and hence of anti-Indian resentment, and India is the strongest counterweight to Chinese influence in Nepal. Indeed, magazines close to the army, like People's Review, have in recent years regularly published the strongest anti-India articles, while lauding China, to the extent that the magazine, on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA), published four full colour pages of articles that were written entirely by Chinese military journalists. The PLA's activities in Tibet were one of the main features. During the unrest in Tibet in spring 2008, the magazine also published numerous articles in praise of China's policies in Tibet.

Nepal's PM, Pushpa Kamal Dahal 'Prachanda' taking salute from an army co...

Despite what it seems, the move also appears to be a first step towards fostering better relations with the formerly despised CPN (M), Nepal's 'Maoists'. The Nepali magazine Newsfront noted in a recent issue that the exact destination of China's financial assistance, which was announced following the trip of Nepal's Defence Minister Ram Bahadur Thapa, a prominent CPN (M) member, to China in September 2008, had not yet been disclosed, but would be "used as per the need of the institution". The magazine also reported that army headquarters had still not been informed about the details of the financial package. The current object of heated debate in Nepal is the planned integration of, or at least at least parts of, the CPN (M)'s guerrilla force, known popularly as the 'Maoist Army' and currently confined to special cantonments under UN observation, into the Nepal army. The plan has raised suspicions amongst the opposition who have alleged that the CPN (M) plans to organise its own army within the Nepal army in clear breach of the peace agreement. It also raises issues related to the lack of formal military training of the former guerrillas. Sources in Nepal speak of plans to send senior commanders of the 'Maoist Army' to China for formal training. Should the endeavour be realised, it would naturally strengthen the links between the Chinese and Nepali military, while helping fostering relations between Beijing and the CPN (M) that have been strained by China's former stance on the party. In the event of tensions developing between the 'old' Nepal army and the 'newcomers', China, with solid links with both elements, would also be an ideal broker, thus allowing for a strategic and unprecedented stake in an institution crucial to Nepal's stability. Under these conditions, a Chinese lobby in Nepal's parliament is superfluous.

Notes:
1: Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), originally a splinter group of the CPN (UML)/Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist), despite its name, a rather mainstream leftist-liberal party. The two other main parties of Nepal were the Congress Party, of centrist-liberal orientation, and the right-wing royalists.
2: See for instance: http://www.tibetinfonet.net/content/news/10160
3: Nepal's Tibetan population is often estimated to number 20,000, but the actual figure is likely to be much higher.